In July 24, 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency published a Request for Information (RFI) regarding the agency’s Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations. The RFI was generated as a part of the Obama Administration’s efforts to implement Executive Order 13650 – Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security.

The Executive Order came in response to the 2013 accident in West, Texas where a fertilizer plant exploded causing numerous fatalities. The order directs OSHA, the Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies to examine their regulations and propose ways to improve chemical safety and security.

Through the RFI, EPA requested comments on possible revisions to the RMP regulations. The RMP RFI is divided into two sections, one of which is very similar to the OSHA RFI on Process Safety Management issued in December of 2013. The second section addresses policies not included in the RFI for PSM.

In response to the RFI, IIAR created a task force to examine EPA’s proposals and draft formal comments. IIAR also worked to build a coalition around these comments. Coalition members co-signing the comments to EPA include: American Frozen Food Institute, American Meat Institute, Global Cold Chain Alliance, International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association and the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association. IIAR will continue working with EPA and its coalition partners as the rulemaking process moves forward.

Below is a summary of the comments submitted by the coalition:

UPDATING THE LIST OF REGULATED SUBSTANCES

EPA requested input on potentially changing the threshold quantities for regulated chemicals. IIAR commented that lowering the ammonia threshold quantity (10,000 lbs.) under the Risk Management program would require smaller independent companies to needlessly increase their operating costs and could inflict financial harm. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Section 112(r)(1) (General Duty Clause) already requires safe operations of facilities/processes with less than threshold quantities of RMP chemicals through prevention of accidental releases and minimization of consequences of releases that do occur.

ADDITIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ELEMENTS

Revising the management-system elements raises a number of questions and concerns. Because RMP is supposed to be performance-based, the coalition opposes requiring specifying management-system metrics required by those subject to the regulation. Requiring facilities to use and share metrics is more prescriptive than a performance-based regulation should mandate.

In addition, RMP regulations already include management practices in almost all elements. Facilities should be free to choose those management system elements which are applicable to the complexity of their operations and to their industry; they should not be constrained to use managementsystem elements which were developed under circumstances which may not apply to their operations.

IMPOSING ADDITIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ON CONTRACTOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS

Additional requirements are not necessary for contractor owners and operators in the ammonia refrigeration industry. Existing federal regulations (EPA and OSHA) are very clear that the “contract owner or operator” is required to ensure training and understanding, following of safety rules, etc. Modification or additional requirements are not needed or required at this time.

CLARIFYING PHA AND HAZARD REVIEW REQUIREMENTS

Specifying the types of failure scenarios and damage mechanisms for PHAs and hazard reviews could be problematic. The implication of such a policy is that EPA would be essentially stating that they know more about the processes and potential failure mechanisms than the experts within each industry. In addition, this would seem to indicate that the scenarios and damage mechanics for all industries are identical. Identification of failure scenarios and damage mechanism is best left to those who have the most experience in each unique process which is being analyzed. Additionally, providing a list of prescriptive failure scenarios and damage mechanics might actually result in less thorough PHAs and hazard reviews.

DEFINE AND REQUIRE EVALUATION OF UPDATES TO APPLICABLE RECOGNIZED AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICES

Adding a definition for RAGAGEP could be useful to help owners better understand requirements under the standard. A definition for RAGAGEP may also be helpful in reducing the instances of EPA inspectors citing standards that are not as applicable to a given type of facility. Better defining RAGAGEP can reduce the misapplication of standards by inspectors and facilitate better understanding and application by facility owners. However, a definition of RAGAGEP should not take away the ability of a facility to identify which RAGAGEP they are applying to their operations.

EXTEND MECHANICAL INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS TO COVER ANY SAFETY-CRITICAL EQUIPMENT

Conceptually, the proposal to expand the coverage of the Mechanical Integrity element to all safety-critical equipment seems reasonable. For the ammonia refrigeration industry, covered facilities already must identify components, controls and PM frequency for them in accordance with OEM recommendations. However, for such a change to be effective, a workable definition of “safety-critical” must be developed and the determination of what is safety-critical can be subject to broad interpretation.

REQUIRE OWNERS AND OPERATORS TO MANAGE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

There is some merit in expanding the Management of Change requirements to include organization changes, as long as there is clear guidance on what organizational changes qualify. If organizational changes are included, “replacements in kind” should be exempted from the management of change requirements. In the spirit of performance based standards, facility owners should be given a sufficient level of fl exibility to design their own programs to meet the requirement.

REQUIRE THIRD-PARTY COMPLIANCE AUDITS

Compliance audits are useful tools for evaluating a facility’s safety. However, there is concern about the intended definition of “third-party”. Thirdparty audits should not be limited to hiring outside personnel to perform the audit. Outside consultants can be very useful, but facilities should have the flexibility to utilize internal safety experts from other facilities or corporate headquarters to perform audits.

SAFER TECHNOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS

The coalition expressed strong concerns with mandating inherently safer technology reviews. The regulatory burden of requiring costly IST reviews tends to stifl e innovation. For those companies who are already looking to improve safety by implementing IST options, a formal IST review would add costs to a process by forcing them to document the activities they are already performing. Small operations might not have the manpower or expertise to do this and lack the resources to hire it out cost-effectively.

Local communities should not be involved in IST analysis. While local communities have good intentions, they have virtually no expertise in safety and risk management as it applies to a specific industry, and often little knowledge of why processes and systems are necessary for economic and material well-being of the community and the country.

EMERGENCY DRILLS TO TEST A SOURCE’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM OR PLAN

Requirements for tabletop drills and/ or functional emergency response exercises on alternating years will likely enhance a chemical user’s awareness and preparedness for emergencies. Recommendation or suggestion of inclusion of local emergency responders would be reasonable to enhance effectiveness of coordination requirements already in effect in the Risk Management Program Rules. Requirements for inclusion of offsite emergency responders, however is not recommended as these resources are not controlled by covered facilities. Staffing and funding limitations may inhibit some responders’ exercise and/ or coordination abilities. Covered facilities must not be penalized if offsite responders are not able to participate.

AUTOMATED DETECTION AND MONITORING FOR RELEASES OF REGULATED SUBSTANCES

RMP should remain performance based, and adding specific requirements for detection and monitoring would be counter to this performance basis. RAGAGEP should be used to determine if/when detection and monitoring devices should be used. EPA should allow facilities to install these devices based on industry standard and guidelines, not regulatory restrictions made by personnel who may have little to no understanding of the nuances of each industrial sector.

ADDITIONAL STATIONARY SOURCE LOCATION REQUIREMENTS

Providing specific requirements is against the performance based nature of the RMP regulation. Introducing siting restrictions such as distance from the covered process to occupancies could become a problem in situations where a facility might want to upgrade to a new and safer engine room but the best location is not compliant with siting restrictions. If adopted, this policy may ultimately encourage facilities to keep running older (potentially less safe) facilities rather than construct newer, modern (and potentially safer) facilities.

COMPLIANCE WITH EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL RESPONDERS

Coordination with local emergency planning and response authorities is an important aspect of safety. As a result, such coordination is already specifically required in the RMP Rules. Enforcement of this issue is linked through Hazard Communication, Emergency Action and HAZWOPER Standards. The coordination with local agencies (e.g. LEPC, Fire Department, Police, etc.) is required by the EPA’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions (40 CFR Part 68.95(c)). An argument can be made that the issue of coordination is already well covered and that adding requirements would be redundant.

Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

Incident investigation requirements as currently written are sufficient for determining the cause of accidents. OSHA PSM regulations already provides compliance guidance on the intent of incident investigation and the applicability of incidents that require investigations to include near misses. Facilities should be free to determine the exact technique used provided that the major causes and all contributing factors are identified as part of the incident investigating technique.

WORST CASE RELEASE SCENARIO QUANTITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROCESSES INVOLVING NUMEROUS SMALL VESSELS STORED TOGETHER

In an ammonia refrigeration system, it is virtually impossible to release the entire ammonia inventory in any single event. Therefore to require the entire system inventory for the process to be used for the worst-case scenario would create an unrealistic picture of risk at the facility. Nearly all incidents, including very serious incidents, at ammonia refrigeration systems involve releases from a single vessel. The changes suggested could increase confusion due to their ambiguous nature of the requirements and thus lead to a lack of uniformity in worst-case scenarios and would not present a true representative of risk in our industry.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO PROMOTE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AND IMPROVE COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDING OF CHEMICAL RISKS

The information contained in the RMP which is submitted to EPA is readily available on-line and there are already requirements for the distribution of Tier II reports to appropriate local authorities. Allowing more information to be disclosed (audits, PHA, etc.) would have the effect of compromising public safety and security by allowing sensitive information be too readily available. Due to the confidential nature of this information, steps should be taken to avoid disclosure, not increase availability.

THE “SAFETY CASE” REGULATORY MODEL

The coalition is strongly opposed to shifting to the “Safety Case” regulatory model. Facilities have invested a lot of time and resources and in many cases are justifiably proud of their PSM and RM Programs. To suddenly move away from these programs in favor of a method not commonly practiced in the United States seems highly inappropriate.